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GIVING DUALISM ITS DUE 
 
William G. Lycan 
 
ABSTRACT 
Despite the current resurgence of modest forms of mind-body dualism, 
traditional Cartesian immaterial-substance dualism has few if any 
defenders.  This paper argues that no convincing case has been against 
substance dualism, and that standard objections to it can be credibly 
answered. 
 
I have been a materialist about the mind for forty years, since first I considered 
the mind-body issue.  In all that time I have seen exactly one argument for mind-body 
dualism that I thought even prima facie convincing.1  And like many other materialists, I 
have often quickly cited standard objections to dualism that are widely taken to be fatal, 
e.g. [Lycan 187: 2-3]—notoriously the dread Interaction Problem.  My materialism has 
never wavered.  Nor is it about to waver now; I cannot take dualism very seriously. 
Being a philosopher, of course I would like to think that my stance is rational, 
held not just instinctively and scientistically and in the mainstream but because the 
arguments do indeed favor materialism over dualism.  But I do not think that, though I 
used to.  My position may be rational, broadly speaking, but not because the arguments 
favor it:  Though the arguments for dualism do (indeed) fail, so do the arguments for 
materialism.  And the standard objections to dualism are not very convincing; if one 
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really manages to be a dualist in the first place, one should not be much impressed by 
them.  My purpose in this paper is to hold my own feet to the fire and admit that I do not 
proportion my belief to the evidence.2
The dualism I shall defend is Cartesian, ‘substance’ dualism.  ‘Property’ dualism 
is more popular nowadays, but it is logically weaker than Cartesian dualism (assuming 
that a Cartesian ego would necessarily have some irreducibly mental properties), and so 
must be more defensible.3    
 
I. Arguments for materialism 
 
Arguments for materialism are few.  Tyler Burge and others have maintained that 
the naturalistic picture of the world is more like a political or religious ideology than like 
a position well supported by evidence, and that materialism is an article of faith based on 
the worship of science.4  That is an overstatement.  But it is true that the original 20th-
century materialists felt no need to defend materialism itself.  Ryle gave no such 
argument that I can recall; he only inveighed against the particularly Cartesian ‘dogma of 
the Ghost in the Machine.’  Ullin Place, founder of the Identity Theory, gave none; he 
was originally a Behaviourist who bravely and honestly acknowledged that introspectible 
occurrent sensations were a problem for Behaviourism and, while making an exception 
for them, tried to account for them within the materialist framework, but without 
defending the need to do so.5  
 
J.J.C. Smart was perhaps the first to offer reasons.6  First, he appealed to the 
scientific view of the world: 
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[S]ensations, states of consciousness,…seem to be the one sort of thing 
left outside the physicalist picture, and for various reasons I just cannot 
believe that this can be so….  That everything should be explicable in 
terms of physics…except the occurrence of sensations seems to me 
frankly unbelievable…. 
The above is largely a confession of faith….  (pp. 142-43) 
 
Just so, and just so.  I too simply refuse to believe in spookstuff or surds in nature.  But 
this argumentum ad recuso credere is no argument at all; it is at best, in David Lewis’ 
famous phrase, an incredulous stare.   
But then Smart did advance a real argument; he appealed to mind-brain 
correlations:  It is reasonable to think that every mental state or event at least has a 
corresponding type of brain state or event.  The best, because most parsimonious, 
explanation of those correlations is that the mental states/events just are the 
‘corresponding’ brain states/events.  (In general:  When Xs are invariably accompanied 
by Ys and you can find nothing to distinguish Xs from Ys, the best explanation is that Xs 
just are Ys.)  
I firmly agree that parsimony or simplicity is a reason for preferring one 
hypothesis to another.7  But it is a very posterior reason.  That is, not only does it always 
carry the qualification ‘other things being equal,’ but many, nearly all, other things must 
be equal before parsimony is called in to break the tie.  And no party to the mind-body 
dispute will deny that dualists have found plenty of features that seem to distinguish 
mental states/events from neurophysiological ones—even if, as materialists contend, all 
those differences are ultimately specious.  To anyone uncontaminated by neuroscience or 
 4
materialist philosophizing, the mental does not seem physical in any way at all, much less 
neurophysiological.  The parsimony argument does not even come in the door until it is 
agreed that we can find nothing to distinguish mental states from neurophysiological 
ones.  And the latter will not be agreed any time soon. 
More decisively, Smart’s alleged correlations have never materialized.  Notice 
that he certainly meant type-correlations; unless one were already presuming token 
identity, it would have been otiose to say that for every mental token, there is a 
‘corresponding’ neurophysiological token.  There may be a few type-correlations holding 
within particular species, but if so they are very few.  Whatever is in common as between 
all human beings who believe that a Frenchman has been assassinated in Trafalgar 
Square (to take an old example of Dennett’s), that feature could not possibly be 
characterized in neuroscientific terms; there are no ‘Frenchman’ neurons, nor 
‘assassination’ areas of the cerebral cortex; at best the feature would be a complicated set 
of external psychosemantic relations to Frenchmen, to assassinations, and to Trafalgar 
Square.  (And good luck to the psychosemanticist.8)9       
 
Matters improved when, independently of each other, David Lewis and D.M. 
Armstrong offered their respective causal arguments for identifying mental states and 
events with neurophysiological states and events.  Their common idea was that mental 
concepts are causal role concepts, and so they afford role-occupant identifications (as in 
the case of genes and segments of DNA molecules) [Lewis 1966], [Lewis 1972], 
[Armstrong 1968: 89-90].  E.g.: 
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1.  Pain = Whatever state of a person plays role P (being typically caused 
by tissue damage, and in turn causing wincing, crying out, 
withdrawal, favoring, etc.)   [We know this a priori; we have all 
got the concept of pain.] 
 
2.  The occupant of role P = the firing of c-fibres10 (i.e., it is c-fibre firings 
that are typically caused by tissue damage, etc.).    [Discovered 
empirically by neuroscientists.] 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
∴ 3.  Pain = the firing of c-fibres.    QED 
 
This was an important development, because the argument was deductive and 
obviously valid.  But is either premise true?  Premise 1 was counterexampled early on by 
Keith Campbell and others: A state of a creature, or for that matter of an assembly of 
Tinkertoys or beer cans, could occupy the commonsense role of pain but without being 
mental at all, much less feeling like a pain.11  (Remember, 1 is a conceptual or at least 
a priori claim; fantastical imaginary cases are fair play.  And remember how little 
information there is in a commonsense causal analysis of pain; see, e.g., Armstrong’s 
analysis on pp. 310-16.)   
Also, 1 is a culpably good premise for materialists.  Obviously, if the very concept 
of pain is a causal concept like ‘poison’ or ‘sunburn’ or ‘footprint,’ and what gets caused 
is physical motion in the form of behaviour, it would be hard to resist the inference that 
pain is physical.  1 does not formally beg the question, but it comes close.  And I shall 
argue shortly that a dualist can quite reasonably resist it.  The dualist should never and 
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would never accept 1 in the first place.  Pain is first and foremost what presents itself to 
consciousness as pain, what feels like pain.  That sort of sensation is indeed caused by 
tissue damage and does cause the customary behaviour, but those are plainly a posteriori 
facts.  (For the dualist to insist that they are contingent would beg the question, but the 
present materialist claim is that they are not just necessary but a priori.12)     
More generally:  The materialist of course takes the third-person perspective; s/he 
scientistically thinks in terms of looking at other people, or rather at various humanoid 
bags of protoplasm, and explaining their behaviour.  But the dualist is back with 
Descartes in the first-person perspective, acquainted with the contents of her own 
consciousness, aware of them as such.  Notice carefully that we need not endorse many 
of Descartes’ own antique and weird views about the mind (that it is entirely nonspatial, 
that it has no parts, that mentality requires language).  The point is only that we know the 
mind primarily through introspection.  Duh!  That idea may, very surprisingly, be wrong; 
it has been attacked by Ryle, by Wittgenstein and by Sellars among others.13  But it is 
obviously common sense, and to deny it is a radical move.  N.b., it does not entail or even 
strongly suggest that the mind is better known than the body or the rest of the physical 
world. 
Turning to the Lewis-Armstrong premise 2, it seems fine until one realizes that its 
first word is ‘the.’  2 begs the question against the dualist view that role P is causally 
overdetermined:  The typical causes cause both neural events and immaterial pain events, 
and pain-behaviour is doubly caused by the neural events aforementioned and the 
immaterial pain events.  (One may feel—as I certainly do—that this overdetermination 
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view is silly and stupid.14  But on what evidence?  Of course the view offends against 
parsimony, but as before, parsimony must wait till all substance has been adjudicated.)   
 
In ‘Naturalism, Materialism and First Philosophy,’ Armstrong [1981] gives a 
general argument for the thesis that we should count a thing as real and admit it to our 
ontology only if we can identify it by its causal powers, for: ‘…if a thing lacks any 
power, if it has no possible effects, then, although it may exist, we can never have any 
good reason to believe that it exists’ (p. 156).  That claim leads directly to materialism, 
Armstrong contends, because we know of no physical effects produced by supposedly 
immaterial occurrences; ‘[m]ost neurophysiologists would be astounded to hear that what 
happens to the brain has any other cause except earlier states of the brain and its physical 
environment’ (p. 154). 
Of course the causal criterion is controversial, because numbers and sets seem to 
be exceptions.  And the argument for it is flawed, because as we know from 
epistemology, knowledge does not require that one’s belief have been caused by the fact 
known.15  But in any case the inference to materialism rests on remorselessly third-
person scientism and (again) on the tacit assumption that the physical effects are not 
overdetermined. 
 
David Papineau [2002] offers a simple deductive argument for materialism, based 
on the causal completeness of physics:16  Conscious events have physical effects; all 
physical effects have sufficient physical causes; the physical effects of conscious causes 
are not, or not always, overdetermined by physical causes; therefore conscious events are 
physical events. 
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This is (indeed) an argument rather than merely a confession of faith.  But 
Papineau admits that there is nothing to support the first premise against 
epiphenomenalism, pre-established harmony and other noninteractive dualisms save 
appeal to ‘standard principles of theory choice’ (p. 23), and he does in fact appeal to 
parsimony: ‘If both views can accommodate the empirical data equally well, then 
ordinary scientific methodology will advise us to accept the simple view that unifies 
mind and brain, rather than the ontologically more profligate story which has the 
conscious states dangling impotently from the brain states’ (ibid.).  Of course I agree, but 
this argument is hardly deductive, and without it the first premise begs the question.   
And on behalf of good old Cartesian interactive dualism, the same point can be 
made against the third premise that I have made against Lewis and Armstrong, that so far 
as has been shown, physical events are systematically overdetermined by physical and 
nonphysical causes.  As before, there is no evidence against that view; it only offends 
parsimony.   
Besides, given quantum indeterminism, it is open to the dualist to deny that all 
physical effects have sufficient physical causes, as Descartes certainly did for the case of 
human actions.  The argument for the completeness of physics itself has to be compelling 
enough to convince the dualist. 
 
I know of no other arguments for materialism. 
 
II. Objections to Cartesian dualism 
 
Here, very briefly, are the four standard objections I highlighted in Consciousness 
[1987].  (This was the usual perfunctory throat-clearing; we all know why Cartesian 
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dualism was rejected.)  (1) The Interaction Problem of course.  (2) Cartesian egos are 
excrescences, queer and obscure, and they are not needed for the explanation of any 
publicly known fact.  (3) Even if conceptually intelligible, Cartesian interaction violates 
known laws of physics, particularly the conservation of matter-energy [Cornman 1978: 
274].  (4) Evolutionary theory embarrasses dualism, since we have no idea how natural 
selection could have produced Cartesian egos; an immaterial substance could not 
possibly be adaptive. 
In his well-regarded textbook Matter and Consciousness, Paul Churchland too has 
rehearsed objections (1)-(4) [1984: 18-21], and like Smart he appeals to simplicity.  He 
adds two further criticisms:  (5) In comparison to neuroscience, dualism is explanatorily 
impotent (pp. 18-19).  (This is not a repetition of (2).  The point is neither that Cartesian 
egos are entia non grata nor that they are not needed for explanation.  It is that the dualist 
theory itself explains nothing.)  (6) All known mental phenomena are highly dependent 
on detailed brain function (p. 20; Churchland says this ‘comes close to being an outright 
refutation of (substance) dualism’).   
There are even more objections, not mentioned by Churchland or me:  (7) Ryle 
argued that Descartes got the epistemology radically wrong.  If Cartesian dualism were 
true, we could not possibly ever know what was going on in someone else’s mind; yet we 
have such knowledge very easily.  (8) There are problems of unity and individuation.  In 
virtue of what are the contents of a Cartesian mind contents of that mind rather than 
another one?  We might answer that by reference to the uniquely associated body, but 
then what accounts for the unique relation between the mind and that body?  (9) There is 
the more specific ‘causal pairing problem’ formulated by John Foster [1991] and pursued 
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by Jaegwon Kim [2005]:  Why does one immaterial ego rather than another count as 
causally interacting with a given body?  It seems there could be two Cartesian minds 
running exactly in parallel but having different sets of physical effects if any. 
  
The case sounds overwhelming.  But now suppose, if you can, that you are a 
Cartesian dualist.  (Paragraph break to let that supposition sink in.)   
Would you be cowed?  No.  There are nine objections to your view.  Of course 
there are; any interesting philosophical view faces at least nine objections.  The question 
is, how well you can answer them?  And I contend that the dualist can answer them fairly 
respectably.  I shall start with the Interaction Problem because I think it is by far the most 
damaging.    
 
III. The Interaction Problem 
 
Entirely nonspatial mental events could not possibly cause physical motion in the 
way that billiard balls cause physical motion; that is nearly tautologous.  But (to my 
knowledge) no one has ever believed that mental events do cause physical motion in the 
way that billiard balls do.17  What, then, is the problem? 
I believe it is that even now we have no good model at all for Cartesian 
interaction.18  Descartes tried the analogy of gravitational attraction, which was promptly 
blasted by Elisabeth.  No one has done much better since.19
I agree that the lack of a good model is a trenchant objection and not just a 
prejudice.  But it is hardly fatal as yet.  For one thing, the lack results at least partly from 
the fact that we have no good theory of causality itself.  The theories that have been 
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called theories ‘of causality’ often seem to have been theories of different things, not of a 
single phenomenon with agreed-upon clear cases.20   
More to the point, causal realism itself has not been popular until pretty 
recently.21  20th-century theories of causality were predominantly Humean, though of 
course there were exceptions.  The more recently prevalent counterfactual theories such 
as David Lewis’ [1973] are not antirealist, but they are semiHumean, requiring only 
specific forms of counterfactual dependence; and no reason has been given why physical 
events could not depend counterfactually on Cartesian mental events.  (N.b., if one says 
that the relevant counterfactuals need actual categorical truthmakers, one thereby gives 
up the counterfactual theory in question.  Lewis himself held that the counterfactuals’ 
truthmakers were facts about other possible worlds and relations between them, but that 
would not per se embarrass Cartesian interaction.) 
Now, further:  Give up any tacit assumption of physical determinism.  I believe 
that will help reduce the sense of outrage, and even hint at a model: perhaps mind-body 
interaction is only probabilistic, as purely physical causation is.   
And now acknowledge the prevalence of weird quantum phenomena.  Though 
there is as yet no model for Cartesian interaction, microphysics gets more and more 
bizarre, and indeed itself resorts (on some interpretations of quantum mechanics) to 
quasi-mental vocabulary.22  We cannot possibly be sure that no model for Cartesian 
interaction will emerge.  
Finally, I have a revisionist suggestion.  The big problem for interaction is and 
remains the utter nonspatiality of Cartesian egos.  (By now we can all tolerate action at a 
distance.  But action at a distance is at least at a distance.)  My suggestion is that the 
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dualist give up nonspatiality.  Descartes had his own 17th-century metaphysical reasons 
for insisting that minds are entirely nonspatial, but we need not accept those.  Why not 
suppose that minds are located where it feels as if they are located, in the head behind the 
eyes?23  If it be protested that our heads are already entirely full of physical stuff and that 
two things cannot occupy the same region of space at the same time:  (1) Immaterial 
minds are not physical.  And what is true is only that two physical things cannot occupy 
the same region of space at the same time.  For that matter, (2) our heads are not entirely 
full of physical stuff.  Physically, they are mostly empty space, with minuscule particles 
zipping through them at very high speeds.  
For the rest of this paper, I shall assume that minds, though immaterial, have 
locations in physical space.  (It may be wondered wherein minds are immaterial, if they 
are spatially located.  In at least two ways: They do not have other physical properties 
such as mass or charge; and unlike brain matter, they are not made of atoms or subatomic 
particles.)    
     
IV. Objections (2)-(4) 
 
(2) Excrescencehood:  In complaining that Cartesian egos are ill-behaved entities 
that fail to earn their keep, the materialist here lodges firmly in the third-person 
perspective and assumes a very strong form of the ‘Theory’ theory, that the sole job of 
mental ascription is to explain facts about the physical world.  But as before, the dualist 
cannot be expected to grant any such assumption in the first place.  Cartesian minds are 
not explanatory posits at all, much less posited to explain physical facts.  They are known 
from the inside, and there is nothing queer or obscure about that.  (And arguments are 
 13
given for the view that they are Cartesian rather than physical.)  Nor is the strong 
‘Theory’ theory tenable:  As Kathleen Wilkes has argued (e.g. [1993]), mental ascriptions 
have all sorts of uses other than explanatory ones.  
 
(3) Laws of physics:  Here I am not qualified to adjudicate.  But it has been argued 
by E. Averill and B. Keating [1981] that the conservation laws regarding linear 
momentum and   matter-energy come in weak versions and stronger versions.24   The 
weak versions are what actually figure in physics.  But they are logically compatible with 
Cartesian causation.  The stronger versions have been adumbrated by some philosophers, 
but are not required for physics and also would beg the question against the dualist.   
Classical Cartesian egos do have one property that is flatly incompatible with 
modern physics’ conception of spacetime:  Cartesian mental events occur in real time, but 
not in space; but that is impossible if time is only one of the four dimensions of 
spacetime.25  Fortunately, we have abandoned Descartes’ nonspatiality assumption. 
 
(4) Evolutionary theory:  At least as stated, the objection is that natural selection 
could not have produced Cartesian egos because they could not be adaptive.  But that 
assumes an extreme Panglossianism: That a trait or entity could not emerge in the course 
of evolution by natural selection unless it, itself, were adaptive.  No evolutionary 
biologist believes that.  Frank Jackson [1982] points out on behalf of epiphenomenalism 
that many un- or maladaptive traits are concomitants or byproducts of other traits that 
were adaptive. 
More to the point, why could the egos not be adaptive, given that they causally 
interact with the physical?  (We have already addressed the Interaction Problem, and are 
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entitled to assume on the dualist’s behalf that minds and bodies interact.)  The objector 
may appeal to the causal completeness of physics, even granting the possibility of 
overdetermination noted in our discussion of Papineau’s argument: It is never solely 
because of a Cartesian ego that a creature did well in the struggle for resources and 
safety, and indeed the creature’s physical characteristics would have taken care of that on 
their own.  But on the overdetermination view, it was not, in fact, solely because of the 
physical characteristics either. 
Unlike mine, Churchland’s version of the evolution objection does not 
specifically appeal to adaptiveness.  What he says is, rather:  
 
For purposes of our discussion, the important point about the standard 
evolutionary story is that the human species and all of its features are the 
wholly physical outcome of a purely physical process….  We are notable 
in that our nervous system is more complex and powerful than those of 
our fellow creatures.  Our inner nature differs from that of simpler 
creatures in degree, but not in kind.  (p. 21) 
 
Which simply and blatantly begs the question. 
(Since question-begging is such an elementary and easily identifiable fallacy, why 
do we seasoned professionals commit it as often as we do?  (I am no exception.)  I 
believe the answer is a more general fact: that we accept deductive arguments mainly 
when we already believe their conclusions.) 
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V. Churchland’s added objections 
 
Each of Churchland’s two new objections is a bit odd.  (Which is itself odd, 
because his book is a textbook.)   
 
(5) Explanatory impotence:  The premises are true; neuroscience explains a great 
deal and dualism explains hardly anything.  But the comparison is misplaced.  Dualism 
competes, not with neuroscience (a science), but with materialism, an opposing 
philosophical theory.  Materialism per se does not explain much either.  (It would have 
explained Smart’s mind-brain correlations, had they existed.)  
Materialism does have one explanatory advantage:  Obviously it explains why 
brain facts are highly relevant to mental facts, better than dualism does.  But the dualist 
does have an explanation:  Though many physical stimuli affect the mind, those that do 
are meager in their information content.  Even patterned retinal hits greatly 
underdetermine the incredibly rich visual experiences that result, and the immediate 
perceptual beliefs that the subject will form as a result of those.  Prodigious transducing is 
needed in order to send the required gigantic mass of hyperfinely structured information 
to and through the pineal gland.  And that is what the brain is for.  (Plausible?  Of course 
not.  But I think only because dualism itself is not plausible.  If one actually is a dualist 
and holds fixed the assumption of Cartesian interaction, the transducer explanation is 
pretty good.)     
 
(6) ’Neural dependence’:  Here I must quote. 
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If there really is a distinct entity in which reasoning, emotion, and 
consciousness take place, and if that entity is dependent on the brain for 
nothing more than sensory experiences as input and volitional executions 
as output, then one would expect reason, emotion, and consciousness to be 
relatively invulnerable to direct control or pathology by manipulation or 
damage to the brain.  But in fact the exact opposite is true….  (p. 20, 
italics original) 
 
Of course the opposite is true.  But why would any dualist accept the premise’s second 
conjoined antecedent?  What dualist ever said or even implied that the mind is dependent 
on the brain for nothing more than sensory experiences as input and volitional executions 
as output?  Descartes himself knew very well that the mental depended in a detailed way 
upon the brain.  And the transducer explanation applies here as well.  We may even add 
that cognition may interdepend in a close way with brain activity:  There is no reason to 
suppose that the mind can do complicated reasoning without the aid of a physical 
calculator; in the real world, most people cannot do complicated reasoning without the 
aid of a physical calculator.  Mind-brain interaction may be constant and very intimate.  
(Here again, the picture is implausible, but only because dualism and Cartesian 
interaction are implausible in the first place.  Subtract those two implausibilities, and the 
rest of the picture is not bad at all.)  
 
VI. The remaining objections 
 
(7)  Epistemology of other minds:  Cartesian egos were nonspatial, which made 
their epistemology seem utterly hopeless.  But remember that Cartesian dualism is 
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interactionist.  Mental events (now occurring inside our heads) cause behaviour.  And so, 
for all that has been shown, we know that our own mental events cause behaviour and we 
infer like causes from like effects.  This is a far from satisfactory solution, but except for 
Analytical Behaviourism, no other is less problematic.  The present objection adds 
nothing to the Interaction Problem itself. 
Ryle thought that you can just see (some of) other people’s mental states and 
events, and do not even unconsciously have to infer them.  I think that view contains a 
very large grain of truth, even though I also think that the mental states and events 
themselves are neurophysiological states and events inside our skulls.  But this is an issue 
in the philosophy of perception, not for philosophers of mind.   
 
(8) Unity and individuation:  Again, Cartesian dualism is interactionist.  The 
contents of a Cartesian mind are contents of that mind (rather than another) in virtue of its 
exclusive causal connection to the relevant human body.   
But then what explains the unique relation between the mind and that body?  This 
is indeed an embarrassing question, but the answer is to be found in whatever would 
explain the appearance of minds in the evolutionary process.  The objection collapses into 
objection (4). 
 
(9) The ‘pairing problem’:   N.b., this is not cured by noting that Cartesian 
dualism is interactionist.   But all parties agree that the problem would be solved if 
Cartesian minds were located in space.  So it is not a problem for my version of 
Cartesianism. 
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Even without my spatializing move, there are options.  For one thing, we need not 
grant that such differences in causal efficacy need explaining; causal relations may be 
brute [Robb and Heil 2003].  For another, as Karen Bennett [2007] points out, there are 
comparable differences in purely physical scenarios, so the dualist is not distinctively 
afflicted.26      
 
I mean to have shown here that although Cartesian dualism faces some serious 
objections, that does not distinguish it from other philosophical theories, and the 
objections are not an order of magnitude worse than those confronting materialism in 
particular.  There remain the implausibilities required by the Cartesian view; but bare 
claim of implausibility is not argument.  Nor have we seen any good argument for 
materialism.  The dialectical upshot is that, on points, and going just by actual arguments 
as opposed to appeals to decency and what good guys believe, materialism is not 
significantly better supported than dualism. 
Yet, I am inclined to believe, the charge of implausibility is not irrational or 
arational either, and I would not want this paper to turn anyone dualist.  Have a nice 
day.27
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1 It is the argument from qualia stated in my book Consciousness [Lycan 1987: 84-85].  
But it is countered by the Representational theory of qualia, defended by me there and in 
[Lycan 1996]; also, [Lycan 1998], [Lycan 2001]. 
For the record, I now believe that there is a more powerful argument for dualism 
based on intentionality itself: from the dismal failure of all materialist psychosemantics; 
see note 8 below. 
 
2 In mitigation, I would note that no philosopher has ever proportioned her/his belief to 
the evidence, if only because we have not got any evidence.  Cf. [van Inwagen 1996].   
N.b., we also always hold our opponents to higher standards of argumentation 
than we obey ourselves.  I have always felt entitled to thumb my nose at dualism so long 
as no valid deductive argument has been presented for it, each of whose premises I must 
accept.   
My admirers (however many or few those may be) need not worry about my 
allegiance:  I have no sympathy with any dualist view, and never will.  This paper is only 
an uncharacteristic exercise in intellectual honesty.  It grew out of a seminar in which for 
methodological purposes I played the role of a committed dualist as energetically as I 
could.  That was a strange feeling, something like being a cat burglar for a few months.  
You could see there was a modus vivendi here, however uncongenial.  
   
3 But not much more.  See [Lycan in preparation]. 
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4 [Burge 1993].  I believe my own faith in materialism is based on science-worship; for a 
justification of the latter attitude (as opposed to an actual argument for materialism), see 
[Armstrong 1973].  But Armstrong also argues there for materialism; see below. 
 
5 Functionalism, the reigning materialism of the past 35 years or so, does not strictly 
entail materialism, but has been held largely because it is the least bad way of remaining 
a materialist.  The only functionalist dualist I have ever known or heard of was the late 
Roland Puccetti (e.g., in [Puccetti 1981]; n.b., ‘Functionalism’ in his title meant, 
Functionalist materialism). 
 
6 [Smart 1959].  Of course there had previously been the damningly quick Positivist 
argument from the Verification theory of meaning to Analytical Behaviourism, but:  (i) 
That was no argument for materialism per se.  And (ii) so much the worse for the 
Verification theory; in any number of cases, it led too quickly to bad metaphysics, such 
as the view that there are not really any little subvisible particles. 
 
7 That is, as more likely to be true.  Despite obvious examples of curve-fitting and the 
like, not everyone grants this; e.g., eloquently, [van Fraassen 1980]. 
In his contribution to the 1967 Presley volume [Gunner 1967], the late Don 
Gunner asked even more eloquently why simplicity should be a reason for belief:  
‘[A] question should be raised as to whether the principles of parsimony and simplicity 
have not become restrictive principles of stinginess and over-simplification.  (Nature is 
lush, prodigal, messy, wasteful, sexy, etc.)’ (pp. 4-5).  (‘Etc.’?)   
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8 For the record, I think intentionality is a much greater obstacle to materialism than is 
anything to do with consciousness, qualia, phenomenal character, subjectivity, etc.  If 
intentionality itself is naturalized, those other things are pretty easily explicated in terms 
of it [Lycan 1996].  But in my view, current psychosemantics is feeble: it treats only of 
concepts tied closely to the thinker’s physical environment; it addresses only thoughts 
and beliefs, and not more exotic propositional attitudes whose functions are not to be 
correct representations; and it does not apply to any thought that is even partly 
metaphorical.  More on these failings in a subsequent paper.  
 
9 Not that Smart ever believed in type correlations between beliefs and anything 
neurophysiological; he remained a behaviourist about beliefs.  Also, as a referee has 
pointed out, there may still be species-specific one-way correlations that need explaining.  
I shall take up this point and offer a dualist alternative in section V below, in response to 
objection (5). 
 
10 To correct a common misconception:  Neither Place, Smart nor Armstrong mentioned 
c-fibres.  C-fibers were introduced to the Identity Theory literature by Putnam in “Minds 
and Machines” [1960].  Thanks to Jack Smart for the reference. 
 
11 [Campbell 1970: 100ff.]; [Block 1978: 277-82].  N.b., this sort of counterexample 
should not be taken to encourage ‘zombie’ objections to materialism generally.  It refutes 
only claims that (i) are conceptual and (ii) explicate mental expressions in terms of 
circumstantial and behavioural events described in ordinary English, as in Lewis’ and 
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Armstrong’s commonsense causal theory of the mind (sometimes misleadingly called 
‘Analytical Functionalism’).  It has no force against a posteriori versions of 
functionalism—at least, not on its own, without supplementation by cumbersome and 
contested apparatus such as that of David Chalmers [1996].  
 
12 As a referee has noted, not many materialists themselves accept premise 1.  I am not 
sure whether even Armstrong does any longer. 
 
13 Ryle’s material on this point was pretty desperate.  Wittgenstein’s Private Language 
Argument has never been well understood, much less generally accepted.  Sellars [1956] 
argued more clearly for the publicity of mental terms’ linguistic meaning, but even 
Sellars’ detailed and ingenious account is contested at many points.  
The first-person perspective is emphasized by Searle [1992]; see also [Georgalis 
2006]. 
 
14 Its falsity is simply assumed by William S. Robinson [1982]–himself a dualist—and by 
David Papineau (see below).  But for defense, see [Mills 1996]. 
 
15 At least two reasons support the latter point:  First, we have at least some knowledge of 
the future.  Second, although perception requires causation by the state of affairs 
perceived, not all knowledge is perceptual. 
 
16 See also his excellent paper on the history of that idea: [Papineau 2001].   
 
 28
                                                                                                                                                 
17 It is just possible that Davidson’s [1970] early view of events, causation and laws 
entails this. 
 
18 As Robinson puts it [1982]. 
 
19 Of course, one can give up mind-to-body causation and go to epiphenomenalism, but 
that view retains body-to-mind causation and so does not claim to solve the Interaction 
Problem.  It is motivated mainly by the causal closure of physics and the implausibility of 
overdetermination.  (Being no scholar, I do not know whether these are what motivated 
Malebranche.  But see Robinson [1982].)  It faces extra objections of its own, but those 
too can be answered: [Jackson 1982], [Robinson 1982], [Robinson 2007].  Robinson is 
probably America’s most committed and ingenious defender of epiphenomenalism.  For 
myself, I do not see its advantages over Cartesian dualism as weighty.  
 
20 A similar but distinct point is made by Karen Bennett [2007]. 
 
21 Notice a general tendency in philosophy:  When working in one area, we feel free to 
presuppose positions in other areas that are (at best) highly controversial among 
practitioners in those areas.  To take a limiting example, philosophers nearly everywhere 
outside epistemology presuppose that we have some knowledge of the external world.  If 
we do have it—as I too presume we do—epistemology has delivered not one tenable 
account of how that can be so.  (Except possibly my own; see my etc.) 
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22 N.b., I am very far from joining in the suggestion made by some that quantum 
mechanics can explain important facts about consciousness (e.g., [Lockwood 1989], 
[Hodgson 1991], [Smith 2003], [Stapp 2004]).  I do not believe that quantum mechanics 
could explain anything at all about consciousness per se; see [Lycan forthcoming].  The 
present point is only about models for Cartesian interaction. 
 
23 Since drafting this, I have learned that my bold move was anticipated by no less a 
figure than Isaac Newton (thanks to Hylarie Kochiras for the references): 
 
That substances of different kinds do not penetrate each other [i.e., co-occupy 
space] does not at all appear from the phenomena. And we ought not rashly to 
assert that which cannot be inferred from the phenomena.   [Newton 1713: 360-
61] 
 
No being can exist which is not in some way related to space.  God is everywhere, 
created minds are somewhere, and body is in the space it occupies.  Whatever is 
neither everywhere nor somewhere does not exist.   [Newton before 1670]: 141]  
 
Following Penelhum [1970: Ch. 2], dualist W.D. Hart [1988] tries to make room 
for the idea that an entirely disembodied person might be able to see real things as well as 
merely have visual experience, and he argues that that would require the person to be 
located in physical space.  (Real seeing requires causal contact, and, according to Hart, 
causal interaction is a matter of energy flow within spacetime.  Hart posits a nonphysical 
‘psychic energy’ that will satisfy the conservation laws.) 
 30
                                                                                                                                                 
Colin McGinn argues [1995] that although mental states and events have some 
space-related properties, they are fundamentally nonspatial.  Therefore, he infers, ‘we 
need, at a minimum, a new conception of space.  We need a conceptual breakthrough in 
the way we think about the medium in which material objects exist, and hence in our 
conception of material objects themselves.’  [1995: 226]  I.e., space has to be 
futuristically reconceived, in order to allow for the existence in the real world of items 
that are at best quasi-spatial.    
 
24 My philosophy of physics colleagues John Roberts and Marc Lange have at least 
cautiously concurred.   See also [Larmer 1986].  
 
25 Actually, William Lane Craig [2001] has suggested that it is only ‘coordinate time’ that 
requires spatial coordinates; if time functions rather as a parameter, it is independent of 
space.  I have no idea what that means, or whether it is true, or whether if true it would 
save Descartes.  (But thanks to Ken Perszyk for the reference.) 
 
26 Foster [1991] offers an ingenious solution to the problem, but it is too complicated to 
expound here. 
   
27 This paper was presented as a keynote at the 2007 AAP Conference at the University 
of New England.  I am grateful to the AAP audience for their good humour and their 
useful discussion.  And thanks to each of two AJP referees for extensive comments that 
have corrected some of the paper’s inadequacies. 
 
